Friday 12 December 2008

The appropriation of Uighur nationalists

During the last few weeks, I have visited sites commemorating of a number of prominent historical Uighur figures, all of whom had little respect for the Chinese in their time and would presumably have little respect for the Chinese presence in their homeland today. Yet, all of these sites were built and are maintained by the Chinese government. What is the reason for this? Why is the government so keen to be involved in these projects, rather than reject them as elements of Uighur nationalism and 'splittism'?

A possible answer:

In the town of Kulja, in the Ili Valley, near to the Kazakhstan border, stands a memorial to nine Uighur politicians, all of whom died in 1949. The plaque reads that the nine politicians were on their way to Beijing to 'unite' for the first meeting of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), when misfortune struck, their plane had an accident and they were all killed. The plaque then explains that the memorial was erected by the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region's (XUAR) Government and endorsed by Mao Zedong himself. In three sentences, their history is explained. However, there is an alternative version of these events.

In the period following the Japanese invasion of China in 1931, the Uighur region fell into a period of weak Chinese influence, as resources and energies were re-focused on the enemy to the East. In 1944, the prevailing conditions allowed a group of Uighurs, supported by other local Turkic peoples, to declare the East Turkistan Republic, an independent Uighur state, ending control by the Chinese Nationalists (Guomindang) in Nanjing. This state was administered from Kulja and headed by an Uighur politician, Ahmedijan Kasim. Five years later, after the end of the civil war, the victorious CCP invited the Kulja politicians to Beijing in order to discuss their relationship with and part in the new China. It was on the way to Beijing that these nine politicians were killed.

The circumstances of their deaths are controversial. Official narrative states that their plane crashed and they were killed in the hills of Manchuria. Some doubt was thrown on this version of events, as it took the CCP until over two months after their deaths to make the announcement, which came after the meeting that they were supposed to attend. It seems particularly convenient for the CCP that potential opponents could be disposed of in this way.

So, given that historically the Ili martyrs were a potential challenge to the hegemony of the CCP, what purpose does it serve the CCP to commemorate them? Would it not be better to keep things quiet and let them fade from history?

I think not.

Even in death, the Ili martyrs could have proved to be a challenge to the CCP. As Uighur nationalist politicians, they had huge potential as rallying points for Uighurs. Their government set a precedence for nationalism in Uighurstan. They showed that an Uighur state outside of Chinese influence was more than just a dream by cementing its reality. For their part, the CCP was very unwilling to see a large part of its western territory fall from its grasp. Xinjiang had long provided them with a buffer to the expansionist Soviet Union and much needed space in a country that was overly populated.

The Chinese government were aware of the extent to which the Ili martyrs could undermine their designs on Xinjiang. They needed to try to ensure that such a series of events would not be allowed to occur again. Realising that denial and suppression would only fan the flames, the CCP took the decision of appropriating the Ili martyrs, only under their own historical narrative.

It was easy for Mao and the CCP to adopt the images of Ahmedijan Kasim and company as communist heroes. They came to prominence battling against the corrupt GMD regime of old China. Therefore, the Ili revolt was framed as being an earlier manifestation of the events that led to the CCP victory. The participants were cast as revolutionaries, brothers-in-arms in a common struggle. They died heroes' deaths serving eternal class war. Today, a museum in Kulja supports photos of Mao proclaiming his new Republic in Tiananmen square alongside pictures of Kasim in Kulja. The proximity of their portraits symbolises the proximity of their ideals.

Once linked so closely to a common cause, the Ili revolt could never function as a tool for Uighur nationalism. The Ili martyrs, commemorated by the government and in a statue decorated with Chinese characters and endorsed by Mao, had their history usurped by a regime acutely aware of the power of defining it.

Such is the importance of historical narrative. The CCP works hard throughout Uighurstan to ensure their version is dominant.

* * *

The Tomb of Abakh Hoja (The Fragrant Concubine) provides more examples. At her family tomb in Kashgar, official versions of her story tell of a beautiful young Kashgari who was taken to Beijing to enter the imperial harem. The Emperor Qianlong was immediately smitten with the girl, but she would not fulfill her role as his concubine, and instead spent all day weeping for home. In his efforts to combat her homesickness and win her over, the Emperor built mosques and bazaars for her and ordered the importation of Kashgari plants and trees.

According to the official narrative, the girl was eventually won over by the Emperor and consigned herself to her new life. “Love between this Uygur maid and the emperor” proclaims the information board outside her tomb “is an evidence for great unity among different ethnic groups in China”. The story, supposedly, reflects the difficulties but also ultimate success in the Chinese's 'taming' of the western lands.

Unsurprisingly, the Uighur version of events differ. While the Uighurs tell the same tale of a Kashgari girl who was kidnapped by the Emperor, the girl's desire for home was not overcome by the Emperor and she remained stoically loyal to her homeland. In a last ditch attempt to win her over, the girl was given the choice of compliance or death, to which she chose death. This version of events is not recorded on the information board outside of the tomb. While the historical factuality of 'The Fragrant Concubine' is not clear, her story is present in both Uighur and Chinese folklore. Although she is ethnically Uighur and her tomb is in a Uighur-dominated area, it is only the Chinese version that is allowed expression.

An idle wander off the officially designated route at the Tomb led me to another example of re-writing, or this time rather non-writing of history. According to the latest information boards, the elderly Tomb of the Fragrant Concubine owes its upkeep and current state of repair to two sources. Firstly to the Emperor Qianlong, who restored it after her death in 1788 and secondly to the XUAR arm of the CCP who, since 1956, have conducted regular repairs to preserve this beautiful construction.

Tucked around a dusty corner out of general sight, I found something puzzling: older, hand written information boards, no longer on official display. Previously, the information boards had been longer and contained more details. In addition to the Emperor Qianlong's contribution, restoration had also been carried out by Yakub Beg in 1873, 'the people' in 1927, and again in 1943, by an unnamed entity. The puzzle was, why had these details been included previously but now omitted?

A possible answer lay next to the Tomb, in the Juma mosque. The Juma mosque is an archetypal model of mosques in the region. An arch doorway topped by half crescents leads you into an open courtyard, on one side of which there is a raised platform, supporting carved wooden pillars and an ornately decorated roof. On the wall facing Mecca there is a small, plastic, analogue clock. An information board details the dimensions and materials used, that the building is protected by the XUAR and that it was construction in 1873, but no sponsor for the construction is given.

It is no coincidence that the name of Yakub Beg has been erased. Beg arrived in Kashgar in 1864 as a military general. Subsequently, he had considerable military success against the Chinese. Within 3 years of his arrival in Kashgar, he had taken the whole of the Tarim basin, including the Chinese capital of Urumqi, and proclaimed himself the King of Kashgar.

Beg's reign was cruel and weighed heavily on the people under it. Beg was not a popular or inspirational leader and not an example of a leader Uighurs might aspire to. Despite this, the CCP feels that his presence in history is enough of a threat to be erased. Why? Because Beg's rule was a discontinuation of Chinese rule.

The Chinese government wants to propagate the myth that since the East Han dynasty (60 B.C.), they have had uninterrupted rule of the area. Without exception, all official mentions of Xinjiang's history included a sentence that attests to its two millenniums as part of the Chinese state. Beg damages their lie. Beg was Turkic in ethnicity, coming from Andijion in today's Uzbekistan. Moreover, his authority and power came from his part in the Great Game, as a pawn for the British and the Russians, rather than from the Chinese. Indeed, Yakub Beg militarily conquered the Chinese, bringing an end to a period of their rule of the region. As a result, Yakub Beg, like the Ili martyrs, poses a threat to the official CCP narrative. Unlike his Ili counterparts though, the CCP have not found a way to link him into their own history so have simply written him out of the story, however clumsily the Tomb's curator has done this.

The Tomb of the Fragrant Concubine in Kashgar, like the Martyr's memorial in Kulja, is run and sponsored by the government because this gives them ultimate control over the version of history that is presented. By dominating the narrative, they seek to control the meaning that these Uighur symbols have, and to disarm any power them may have for resistance.

* * *

The third site we visited was the memorial to Mahmoud Kashgari, a 11th Century Uighur scholar. Kashgari, (meaning 'of Kashgar'), spent many years of his life in Baghdad where he received an Islamic eduction. His greatest composition was the 'Great Turkic Dictionary'. Kashgari's life occurred aside from the Chinese or their state. Indeed, Kashgari, a committed Turkic nationalist, was anti-Chinese, referring to them as 'the trouble-makers in the East'. In later life, Kashgari returned to Kashgar to establish a school, in the modern day village of Opal. When he died at the age of 97, he was buried on a hill nearby, with views stretching out across the valley to the huge Pamir mountain range in the distance. After nearly 1000 years, the tomb of Kashgari was a wind swept ruin, comprising of a crumbling half-cylindrical stone and a few wobbly pillars that must have supported a long-gone roof.

The final conundrum:

As the 1000th year of Kashgari's death approached, the XUAR arm of the CCP decided to renovate the Tomb of Kashgari. The tomb is now covered with beautiful fabrics and a headstone added to give the details of Kashgari's life. It has been enclosed in a new building which contains a small museum and prayer room. Surrounding the building are kept-gardens and a 10-metre high statue of Kashgari himself made of white marble.

I am sure that Kashgari is turning in his grave at the sight of what is happening to his descendants today. He regarded the Chinese with disdain and would certainly object to the current Chinese dominance of his kin. So once again, why do the Chinese government choose to honour him? Simply, I believe, because the most efficient way to undermine Kashgari's historical legacy is for the Chinese government to manipulate this legacy and to re-write Kashgari in terms of their choosing. This is achieved by excluding references to his anti-Chineseness and including references to his presence as an ethnic minority in the inseparable multi-ethnic Chinese empire. By reconstructing his tomb, they choose what is written about him. The information is in the Chinese language as well as Uighur and labeled 'protected by the government of the XUAR'. Posthumously, Kashgari has been assimilated into greater China.
* * *

In all of the cases that I mentioned, the Chinese government is engaging itself in a process of re-writing Uighur history in order to incorporate it into the official narrative currently espoused by Beijing. The methods by which it does this vary on a case by case scenario. Some figures can be assimilated others have to be destroyed, but none can be left untouched for fear of providing the Uighurs with something that challenges the myth of a continuous, unchanging Chinese authority in the region.

1 comment:

Anonymous said...

I recommend you check out the Muslim Graveyard of Urumqi. There are a lot of individuals buried there who were a part of the anti-GMD movements of the 30s and have been recast by the CCP as proto-communist heroes. Uyghurs go there to honor and commemorate those individuals but for reasons the CCP probably wouldn't like.